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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH ADOPTION SERVICE FOR
WOMEN, a Utah non-profit
corporation,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent

:

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

v.

:

Civil No. C88-Q3292

BRADLEY THOMAS BELANGER

:

Case No. 890018 - CA

:

Priority #7

Defendant/Appellant

:

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 782a-3(g) (1987) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On or about May 18, 1988 the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for
declaratory judgment that temporary custody of the male minor
child conceived and born to Defendant Bradley Thomas Belanger, a
resident of the State of Nevada, and one "D.R.F." in the state of
Nevada was properly in the Plaintiff, Utah Adoption Services for
Women, and for an order granting that Plaintiff could place said
child for adoption pursuant to said temporary custody.

Defendant

responded with a Counterclaim claiming that he had stated his
opposition to the placement of said child for adoption, that he

sought custody of said child and that he had been damaged by the
Plaintiff's placement of said child for adoption.

A trial of

this matter was held in September and October, 1988 at which time
the Court found that Defendant was the natural
minor

father of said

child; that Defendant did not exercise his rights in the

State of Nevada for establishment of paternity; that the signing
of the consent by Defendant releasing said child to "D.R.F" for
adoption was not without duress and coercion and that there was
no evidence

to support

acted in bad faith.
and granted
that

registering

The Court found in favor of the Plaintiff

the relief

the Defendant

Defendant's- claims that the Plaintiff

sought by the Plaintiff, and concluded

should

paternity;

have

complied

with

Utah

law

in

that Defendant had failed to establish

paternity in Nevada pursuant to Nevada law; that the purported
consent signed by Defendant was invalid; and that the Interstate
Compact on Adoptions was not applicable to this proceeding.

This

is an appeal of the Memorandum Decision rendered by the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable
November
Fact.

Leonard

9, 1988.

H. Russon

presiding, entered

After trial

the Court

on or about

issued Findings of

The Appellant considers the following findings central to

the instant appeal:
24.

That night, the evening of April 27, 1988, Belanger

(Appellant) in a telephone conversation with "D.R.F."
that she had executed
child for adoption.

the Release

and Consent and placed the

Belanger said he was going
2

learned

to resist

the

adoption.

"D.R.F.: did not relay that

information to Bagley

(Respondent) until the next Saturday, April 30, 1988.
26.

Belanger was informed on Tuesday, May 3, 1988 by his

lawyer that Nevada law required him to file an affidavit at the
hospital to be on the birth certificate, and if not, to file an
affidavit

with

the Nevada

Department

acknowledging paternity of the child.

of Vital

Statistics

He filed an affidavit with

the State more than a week after the birth and two months later
he received a birth certificate with.his name on it.

Belanger

and D.R.F. had labored under the belief that Belanger's name was
going to be on the birth certificate since his name was on the
"worksheet."
placed

There is no evidence as to why the name was not

on the birth certificate, except that the proper papers

were not filed.
29.

Under the facts of this case, with the clear knowledge

of Belanger that the child was to be born in Utah, to be placed
for adoption with the Plaintiff in Utah, the defendant literally
had months in which to so register with the Utah Bureau of Vital
Statistics since such registration may occur prior to the birth
of a child in Utah.

And, during this time, plaintiff had legal

counsel in other matters and could have and should have protected
his rights because of the notice and knowledge
this matter.

that he had in

Belanger did not exercise his rights in the state

of Nevada for establishment of paternity as required by Nevada
statutes.

He and the natural mother were never married, they did

not co-habit

for at least six months prior
3

to the period of

conception, nor continued

to co-habit

through the period of

conception, before the child's birth he and the natural mother
did not attempt

to marry one another, he did not receive the

child into his home and hold it out openly as his own natural
child, and he did not timely acknowledged or admitted

(sic) his

paternity in a writing filed with the Nevada State Registrar of
Vital Statistics as required.
30.

The Defendant eventually filed an affidavit in Nevada

claiming paternity.

By then, however,- the child had been placed

by the natural mother, with the appropriate consent and release
with the plaintiff adoption agency in Utah.
32.

(a)

The mother, herself, brought the baby into Utah

and placed it with the adoptive family and agency and signed her
consent and release before a notary in Utah.
(b)
agency

The

mother had initially contacted the adoption

in Utah while living

in Utah with her sister concerning

the adoption of the baby.
(c)

The mother's

intention

was

to travel

California to Utah for the purpose of delivering
placing

from

her baby and

it with an adoption agency, and the premature delivery

was not anticipated.

Only by accident was the baby born in

Nevada.
(d)

Both

the

father

and

the mother

knew of the

mother's intention to give birth to the baby in Utah.
(e)

After

the premature

delivery

in Nevada, both

mother and father knew of her plans to personally
4

deliver the

baby in Utah to adoptive parents and the adoption agency.
33.

The Court further finds that there were no actions upon

the part of the plaintiff Utah Adoption Services for Women or its
agents

supporting

counterclaim.

the

claims

their

the

defendant

in

his

The plaintiff acted in good faith in its attempt

to assist the natural mother
adoption.

of

in placement

of her

child

for

D.R.F. approached the Plaintiff in Utah, and requested

services.

California

The agency

made

the

effort

to

travel

to

to talk to D.R.F. and the father of the child, and

left a consent form with him.

While the adoption agency knew the

father did not want the child to be placed for adoption, he never
refused, nor did he indicate to the adoption agency that he would
not consent

(until after the child had been placed).

While the

consent has been determined not to be valid, because of all the
facts known to the adoption agency, it was not unreasonable to
dictate a consent, although
Belanger

would

inadequate, and

to believe

that

sign this consent with his understanding

full

knowledge that it had come from the adoption agency and was for
the purpose of the child being released for adoption.
no facts to support any claim of unethical
conduct,

or

that

the plaintiff

agency

or

acted

There are

unprofessional
wrongfully or

maliciously.
34.

Belanger did not register with the Utah Department of

Vital Statistics as provided under Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4,
1953 as amended.
Pursuant to these Findings of Fact the Court concluded, as a
5

matter of law, that:
5,

Utah law required the natural father making a claim of

paternity to register with the Utah Registrar of the Department
of Vital Statistics, and to indicate his willingness to support
the child to the best of his ability, and failure to do so prior
to the child

being

relinquished

adoption terminated his rights.
the Utah Department
knowledge

that

adoption

agency

or placed with an agency for
Belanger did not register with

of Vital Statistics.

the baby was going

Since he had full

to be relinquished

to the

in question in the State of Utah, and he knew

when D.R.F. was flying to the State of Utah for this purpose, to
protect his rights he was obligated to so register.

His failure

to do so terminated his rights within Utah.
6.

The Court finds that if it is a requirement in a Utah

adoption to check for similar acknowledgment statutes

in other

states that the defendant failed to establish his paternity as
required by Nevada law prior to the relinquishment of the child
for adoption.
8.

The Interstate Compact on Adoptions is not applicable to

this proceeding or the underlying adoption.
14.

The Nevada statute, NRS 126.041-041 state that a man

"may establish his paternity where

(1) he and

the mother

have

been married during a certain period, or (2) the father and the
natural mother were co-habiting for at least six months
the period

of conception and continued

before

to co-habit through the

period of conception, or, (3) he receives the child into his own
6

home and openly holds it out as his natural child, or (4) he and
the mother attempt to marry before the birth, or (5) at any time
he acknowledges or admits paternity of the child in writing filed
with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics."

ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT
1.

Did

the

trial

Defendant/Appellant

had

court

err

in

not satisfied

finding

that

legal requirements

the
to

proclaim himself the natural father of the child, the Appellant
having

fully

satisfied

the requirements

under

residence and the state of birth of the child,

his state

of

the State of

Nevada?
2.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

requiring

the

Defendant/Appellant to register with the Utah Department of Vital
Statistics when Appellant was a resident of Nevada and the said
child was conceived and born in Nevada?
3.

Did the trial court deprive the Appellant of due process

rights by terminating his parental rights for failure to provide
proper notice of paternity as required by Utah law.
4.
Compact

Did the trial court err in finding that the Interstate
on placement

of children was not applicable

matter and that Plaintiff/Respondent had not violated
Compact?

7

to this
the said

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Brad Belanger has been a resident of the State of
Nevada his entire life.
lived together

(Tr. 2 of 3, p. 114)

in Las Vegas, Nevada

He and "D.R.F."

for a period

of

several

months (Tr, 1 of 3, p. 145) and a result of this relationship, a
child was conceived.

"D.R.F." during her pregnancy visited with

her sister in Salt Lake City, Utah for a few weeks, and, without
the

knowledge

of

Plaintiff/Respondent,

the

Appellant,

Utah Adoption

contacted

Services

the

for Women, Ms.

Bagley, director, to discuss a possible adoption of the baby she
was carrying.
returned

(Tr. 1 of 3, pp. 145 - 1 4 8 ) .

to Las Vegas, Nevada

to live with

"D.R.F." then
her

mother

and

subsequently left to reside with a friend in Ontario, California
after the Appellant refused to agree that placing the parties 1
expected child for adoption was an acceptable option.

(Tr. 1 of

3, p. 149).
During this separation Appellant and "D.R.F." had numerous
telephone contacts (Tr. 1 of 3, p. 151), and "D.R.F." requested
Appellant to meet with her and Respondent in Ontario, California
to provide family background information for an adoption, and at
the time of the meeting

Respondent left release documents for

Appellant

expected

releasing

the

child

for

adoption,

but

Appellant informed Respondent that he would not sign a consent or
release.

(Tr. 1 of 3, pp. 155 and 158).

On April

25, 1988

"D.R.F." gave birth to a male child in
8

Henderson, Nevada with
role.

the Appellant

(Tr. 1 of 3, p. 162).

provided

by the hospital

certificate

to ensure

father, since

present in a supporting

Appellant checked

the worksheet

for the filing of the child's birth

that

his name was

entered

165).

natural

"D.R.F." was in constant contact with Respondent

and appeared to be still considering an adoption.
p.

as

Respondent

advised

"D.R.F."

not

(Tr. 1 of 3,
to

enter

the

Appellant's name on the birth certificate as that would "make the
adoption

easier" but Appellant and /'D.R.F." entered his name.

(Tr. 1 of 3,
contained
assumed

p. 167).

From the filing of this worksheet which

the name of Appellant as natural father, all parties
that

Appellant's

name

would

appear

on

the

certificate, and all parties acknowledged his paternity.

birth
(Tr. 1

of 3, p 165 and p. 169).
On April 26, 1988, the Appellant, "D.R.F.1, and the newborn
child removed

from

the hospital

to a nearby motel where

the

Appellant believed that he could convince "D.R.F." to abandon the
idea of

the adoption

parents' residence.
168, pp. 173-174).

and go with

him

and

the child

to

his

(Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 126-172), (Tr. 1 of 3, p.
During that evening and night the Appellant

held the child and talked about keeping the child and raising him
themselves.

Also during

that evening

"D.R.F."

telephoned

Respondent and talked to her and Respondent dictated a consent
form for Appellant to sign releasing the child to "D.R.F." for
adoption, Respondent stating that now the natural father had been
entered on the birth certificate, his consent would have
9

to be

obtained.

(Tr. 1 of 3, pp. 169-171).

Respondent had purchased an airline ticket for "D.R.F." to
fly to Utah for the birth of the child, but when said child was
born in Nevada, "D.R.F." was to use the ticket

to avoid

the

Interstate Compact for adoption regulations by having the mother
bring the child to Utah thereby avoiding having the Respondent or
adoption agency bring the child or cause him to be brought from
another state for adoption placement.
"D.R.F."

was

(Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 249-252).

to fly to Utah on April

27, 1988. Appellant

assumed that he would be the one to drive them to the airport and
would have until that time to convince "D.R.F."
idea of adoption.

However

early

to abandon the

the following morning,

the

mother of "D.R.F" and a family friend, a police officer, arrived
at the motel, and Appellant

began

to realize

decided to take the flight to Utah.

that D.R.F. had

"D.R.F." then produced the

consent which had been dictated by Respondent

and after

being

urged by "D.R.F." and her mother that he had promised to sign a
release

in exchange

for being

certificate, the Appellant,

included

on the child's

in tears and protesting

didn't want to do this, signed the consent.

birth

that he

(Tr. 2 of 3, pp.

127-127).
Respondent

realized

that

the

consent

form

signed

by

Appellant was inadequate, as it was later ruled by the court
invalid, and forwarded adoption documents to the Nevada Welfare
Department for Appellant to sign.

(Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 130, 262).

Appellant was called to the office of one Marguerite Williams of
10

that department

on Monday, May 2, 1988f and she advised

himf

after he stated that he objected to the placement of his child
for

adoption,

Appellant met

to seek legal advice.

(Tr. 2 of 3, p. 133).

the next day, May 3rd, with Robert

E. Gaston,

attorney, who immediately telephoned Respondent and notified her
that Appellant was not going

to sign the release

forms, was

seeking the return of the child to Nevada, and seeking custody of
said child. (Tr. 2 of 3, p. 134).

Respondent

told Mr. Gaston

that she had already placed the child for adoption and did not
need a release form from the Appellant.
a Certificate

of Search

Respondent then caused

for Acknowledgment of Paternity to be

issued in the State of Utah on May 11, 1988, in spite of her
knowledge that Appellant was the father of said child, and that
his

name

had

certificate

been

submitted

for

in the State of Nevada.

recording

on

the

birth

Interestingly Respondent

made no such search for acknowledgment of paternity in the State
of Nevada.
On May 4, 1988, the day following

the meeting

with his

attorney, Appellant, acting on the advice of his attorney that he
must file an Affidavit of Paternity in the State of Nevada when
the parents of a child are unwed, arrived in Fontana, California
to ask

"D.R.F." to sign the natural mother's portion of said

Affidavit.

"D.R.F."

refused

to sign, on

the advice

of

the

Respondent who again advised "D.R.F." that the adoption would be
easier" if "D.R.F." did not sign, so the Appellant
Affidavit

of Paternity with

filed

the

the State of Nevada without her
11

signature.

Concurrently the Appellant filed an action in the

State of Nevada, believing that, as the state of birth of the
child, Nevada was the appropriate forum.
Five days after she was served with the Appellant's

Clark

County action, the Respondent filed an action in the Salt Lake
County

District

Court

jurisdictional conflict.

for declaratory

judgment,

creating

a

The Clark County, Nevada Court referee

ruled that the Appellant was the natural father of said

child,

that he had a cause of action, and referred the matter to the
State of Utah as the present state of domicile of the said child,
leading to the action and decision appealed herein.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I
The trial court erred in finding, in paragraph

29 of the

Court's Findings of Fact that Appellant had not satisfied legal
requirements to establish himself as the natural father of the
child

in the State of Nevada.

In paragraph 14 of the Court's

Conclusions of Law, the Court concluded:
"The Nevada statute, NRS 126.041-041 state
that a man "may establish his paternity where
(1) he and the mother have been married during
a certain period, or (2) the father and the
natural mother were co-habiting for at least
six (6) months before the period of conception
and continued to co-habit through the period
of conception, or, (3) he receives the child
into his own home and openly holds it out as
his natural child, or (4) he and the mother
attempted to marry before the birth, or (5) at
any time he acknowledges or admits his paternity
of the child in a writing filed with the State
Registrar of Vital Statistics."

12

The Appellant in fact did acknowledged his paternity in writing
with the State of Nevada.
step and

undertook

each

The Appellant took every affirmative
and

every procedure

as each

became

necessary and as he became aware of each requirement.

He did

insist on being entered on the worksheet at the hospital which he
believed at the time would result in his name being on the birth
certificate.

He did file an Affidavit of Paternity with the

State of Nevada.
resulted

He did bring a legal action in Nevada

in him being declared

length of the period
ultimate

between

the father of said child.

the birth of the child

The

and the

issuance of a birth certificate listing Appellant as

father was the result of the actions
adoption

which

agency

to avoid

dealing

of

with

the mother

and

the Appellant

the

in the

adoption, and not the result of any indifference or unnecessary
delay on the part of Appellant.
The Court's Conclusion of Law, paragraph 5, that Appellant
should have filed an acknowledgment of paternity in Utah demands
an unreasonable

standard

of adherence

to the law of another

state from a party who was doing everything he knew how to do to
acknowledge

paternity

in the state

of birth

Further it was unreasonable to expect Appellant

of his
to have

child.
taken

action in Utah prior to the birth of the child when both he and
"D.R.F" testified that the Utah adoption was always

discussed

between the parties as an "option" until such time as it actually
took place.
Utah

case

law which has established
13

the unwed

father's

responsibility to file acknowledgment of paternity and object to
the adoption

in a timely manner

have

the following

common

threads:
1.
2.

Both parents were Utah residents,
The

father

would

not

assume

any

financial

responsibility for the mother or baby.
3.

The father did

not sign a birth certificate or

acknowledgments of paternity,
4.

Neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency

were involved in an effort to prevent the father from asserting
his parental rights,
5.

Neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency

knew at the time of relinquishment that the father was seeking to
assert his parental rights.
The facts of the present case differ substantially from the
above determining factors.

Point II
The trial court erred in finding that the Appellant had to
register

his claim

to paternity

in the State of Utah.

The

Appellant was a resident of the State of Nevada, the natural
mother

had

been

a resident

of Nevada, the

said

child

was

conceived and born in Nevada, the Respondent knew the identity of
the natural

father

and did not at any time advise him of the

necessity of filing any acknowledgment of paternity, let alone of
filing one in the State of Utah,
14

and the Appellant believed that

he was doing

everything

necessary

to establish

his parental

rights by filing his claim of paternity in the State of Nevada.
It is reasonable and fairf given in the facts of this case, that
the natural father, the Appellant, should be determined to have
satisfied

the

requirements

of

the State

of Utah

by having

satisfied the requirements of the State of Nevada.

Point III
The Appellant
Nevada

followed

the procedures

the State of

in claiming paternity of the child, obtained counsel to

seek the return of the child, brought
Nevada

for

action

in the State of

to declare his paternity and to seek the return of the

child to Nevada, sought and took alternative measures when the
Respondent

adoption agency, and the mother failed to cooperate

with his attempts to file his claim
times to all persons claimed

to paternity,

and at all

his paternity and expressed his

desire to raise and provide for the child.

The adoption agency

withheld specific information that it knew when Dr. Bagley used
the jurisdiction of the State of Nevada, sought counsel on the
Interstate Compact, and search for acknowledgment of paternity in
the

State

of

Utah,

all

Appellant's opportunity

of

which

adversely

affected

to fairly claim his child.

the

The trial

court deprived the Appellant of his right to due process when it
terminated his parental rights for failing to file proper notice.

15

Point IV
The Appellant claims that the purchase of the transportation
ticket

by Respondent

adoption

agency

"brought, or caused to bring" as provided

constitutes

having

under Article

III,

Conditions of Placement of the Interstate Compact on Placement of
Children, Utah Code Annotated,
Respondent

testified

that

55-8b, 1953 as amended.

she

sought

the

advice

authorities of the Interstate Compact before placing

The

of

the

the child

for adoption in Utah and claimed that she was not, according to
the opinion of those authorities bound by the provisions of that
Compact in the instant case.

The finding that Respondent should

or should

not have complied

with

important

to Appellant

because

the Interstate Compact
in the event

Respondent

was
was

subject to said Compact, the State of Nevada would have been put
on notice, and Appellant

would have had more opportunity to

assert his claim of paternity.
However Respondent testified that she withheld
from those authorities which may or would
opinion, specifically

information

have affected

their

that she, Respondent, had paid for the

ticket to transport the mother

and child

from California

and

subsequently, Nevada, and the crucial information that the child
was born in Nevada.

The trial Court erred in finding that the

Interstate Compact on Placement of Children for adoption was not
applicable in this case.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT
HAD NOT SATISFIED LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO PROCLAIM
HIMSELF THE NATURAL FATHER OF THE CHILD, THE
APPELLANT HAVING FULLY SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS
UNDER HIS STATE OF RESIDENCE AND THE STATE OF BIRTH
OF THE CHILD, THE STATE OF NEVADA.
In support of its ruling that Appellant had not satisfied
legal requirements to proclaim himself that natural father of the
child the Court stated in page 12 of its Memorandum Decision
entered in this matter that Appellant knew that "D.R.F." intended
to give birth to her expected child in Utah and to place said
child for adoption in Utah, and that further Appellant knew that
"D.R.F."

flew to Utah with the child with that intent.

From

that "knowledge" the Court concludes that Appellant should have
reasonably been expected to protect his rights pertaining to said
child by filing
Utah.

an acknowledgment of paternity in the State of

(Conclusion of Law, #5)

This does not seem to be a

reasonable requirement for someone who is not conversant with the
law.

It would perhaps have been reasonable to assume that a

layman, upon the birth of his child in the State of Utah, would
conclude that he should file an acknowledgment of paternity in
Utah, but when his child is born in Nevada and he is a resident
of that state, he would reasonably be expected to pursue that
acknowledgment in Nevada.
It is an inaccurate finding that Appellant had known for
months that "D.R.F." intended to place the baby for adoption in
Utah

since

"D.R.F." herself
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in testimony

supported

the

Appellant's claim that he believed adoption was always only an
option by stating that she was not, prior to the birth of the
child, confirmed that she was placing the child for adoption and
said "No, I was never totally going

to do it until

I did

This is something I can't decide until I had the baby."

it.

(Tr. 1

of 3, p. 163).

The only testimony adduced at the time of trial

with regard to

"D.R.F's" intent to place the child for adoption

came from Appellant and "D.R.F." who both testified that it was
only

discussed

experienced

between

the two as an option

disagreement

adoption as an alternative.

when Appellant

and

refused

that
to

they

discuss

Testimony from Respondent indicates

only that she knew that Appellant was unwilling and unresponsive,
and noted in her progress

notes that at the hospital

he was

suggesting arrangements for the remodelling of his parents' home
to make a home for the child to be with its' parents. (Ex. P-8).
No witness

testified

that

it was a known and

sure fact

during the months preceding the birth of the child that "D.R.F"
was certainly placing the child for adoption in Utah as concluded
by the Court.

The Court, in Findings of Fact 32(c), stated that

"Only by accident was the child born in Nevada."

Testimony and

the notes of Respondent indicate that it had always been planned
for "D.R.F." to stop in Las Vegas at that time for her birthday
celebration.
that occasion

As always, "D.R.F."s" discussions with Appellant on
supported

Appellant's belief that "D.R.F." was

still considering his arguments against an adoption.
The Court ruled on Page 14 of the Memorandum Decision, with
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regard

to

the

State

of Nevada,

that

the Appellant

"never

acknowledged or admitted his paternity in writing filed with the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics as required."
not the case.

This is simply

The Appellant's Affidavit of Paternity was filed

May 4, 1988 in the State of Nevada

(Tr. 2 of 3, p. 117).

The

Nevada statute, NRS 126.041-041, requires:
". . . a man "may establish his paternity
where (1) he and the mother have been married
during a certain period, or (2) the father
and the natural mother were co-habiting for
at least six months before the period of
conception and continued to co-habit through
the period of conception, or, (3) he receives
the child into his own home and openly holds
it out as his natural child, or (4) he and
the mother attempt to marry before the birth,
or (5) at any time he acknowledges or admits
paternity of the child in writing filed with
the State Registrar of Vital Statistics."
In trying to understand

the Court's

ruling, one can infer one of two reasons:

rational

behind

the

(1) that the Court is

making a requirement of the Appellant that he should have taken
such action
supposedly
adoption

before
knew

the birth

the mother

immediately

at

its

of the child,

intended
birth;

since

to place
or

(2)

Appellant

the child

that

Court

for
has

determined that the Appellant should have filed his admission of
paternity

before Respondent's placement of the child with the

adoption parents.
In response to (1), the Appellant clung to his determination
and belief that he could change the mother's mind, and

(2) that

his rights as a parent would be protected if he ensured, somehow,
that he was

included

on the child's
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birth

certificate.

He

consequently

took every action reasonably expected of a layman

from the moment of the child's birth to ensure that he was on the
birth certificate, including, but not limited to,
the hospital the day of "D.R.F.'s" departure
child

to request

Williams

of

telephoning

to Utah with

the

the birth certificate; talking to Marguerite

the Nevada Welfare

Department

and

immediately

following up on her suggestion, which had obviously not occurred
to him previously,

to consult

with

an attorney;

talking

by

telephone with an attorney that same day and consulting with him
the next day; leaving
California

the same day and arriving

the next in

to secure the mother's signature on an Affidavit of

Paternity as advised by his counsel;
available upon

"D.R.F.'s" refusal

taking

the only avenue

to sign said Affidavit by

filing it that same day back in Nevada without her signature; and
concurrently initiating a legal action in the county of birth of
the minor child to halt the adoption proceedings and obtaining a
ruling

thereby of his paternity.

In effect Appellant took

every action which could reasonably be expected of him to satisfy
Nevada's requirements

to proclaim himself the father

of the

child.
It is unfair
achieved

and unjust

the desired

paternity

end

to expect

result

in the short period

of

the Appellant to have

the proclaiming

of

his

of time, two days, between the

child's birth in Nevada and his placement for adoption when such
process was made unnecessarily
deliberate

actions of both

lengthy by the intentional and

the Respondent
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and

" D.R.F. " to

frustrate Appellant's claim to paternity as follows:
a)

The Appellant was present

child, and entered
hospital for

the

at the

birth

of the

his name on the worksheet provided by the

filing of a birth certificate,

in spite of

Respondent's advice to "D.R.F." that "the adoption would proceed
easier"

if his name was not

"D.R.F."

believed

that

the

included.

Both Appellant

worksheet

would

lead

and

to

the

Appellant's name being included on the birth certificate and all
parties had expected it to be so.
b)

Both Appellant and "D.R.F." testified that "D.R.F."

represented to Appellant that she could
entering

of Appellant's

and would

prevent

name on the birth certificate

the

if he

refused to sign his consent to release the child to "D.R.F." for
adoption.

Appellant did so.
c)

When Appellant rushed to California to obtain the

signature of "D.R.F." on the Affidavit

of Paternity,

"D.R.F."

telephoned

and Respondent

advised

"D.R.F."

the Respondent

not

to sign

for advice

such

affidavit

proceed more easily if she didn't."
returned to Nevada and

filed

as "the

adoption

The Appellant

his own affidavit

would

immediately

acknowledging

paternity of the child.
d)

Because of the refusal of "D.R.F." to sign the

affidavit, the Appellant was required to wait a sixty (60) day
waiting period for the mother to dispute said affidavit (Nevada
statute 128.150) or rely on a court ruling of his paternity to
bring

about

the issuance of the birth certificate bearing his
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name as natural father.
e)

Respondent stated in testimony (Tr. 1 of 3, p. 131)

in response to a question as to why she did

not check

in the

State of Nevada prior to placement for adoption that "it wouldn't
have done any good because it takes a week to ten days for the
birth certificates to get there anyway."
In light

of

the delays

caused

by

the

actions

of

the

Respondent and "D.R.F." and the circumstances in this matter, the
Defendant/Appellant had satisfied all requirements of his state
of residence and the state of the birth of the child, the State
of Nevada, to establish paternity and to have his name entered on
the birth certificate as father of said child as expeditiously as
possible.

Any use of the adjective "untimely" is unreasonable in

this case in light of the Appellant's actions,

and not supported

by the Nevada statute which states paternity may be acknowledged
"at any time."
Further, with regard to the Appellant's opportunity to take
affirmative action prior to the birth of the child,
expectation

such an

fails to take into account many normal factors,

including the Appellant's genuine wish to convince "D.R.F.", not
intimidate and threaten, and his polite and unassertive behavior
with

Respondent

at their

only meeting

being

the result of

instructions from "D.R.F." to "be nice" and not from any lack of
desire

to strongly express his opposition to the adoption.

It

also fails to take into account the fact that it is very normal
for a father to fail to realize his child as more than an idea
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until

the actual birth; until holding the child himself.

The

mother carries the child and is physically aware of the reality
of another being, but this is not the case for a father.
father was galvanized

into action after seeing and holding

This
his

son, and realizing the morning of the signing of the consent and
the flight to Utah, that "D.R.F." was going to go ahead with an
adoption and that he must take every action he could think of f
like calling the hospital for a copy of the birth certificate and
going to the library to check the statutes to ensure

that his

consent would be necessary before the adoption could proceed.
In the present case, there are no facts to support a claim
that Appellant
paternity.

had

any knowledge about registering a claim to

In Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp.

1537 (D. Utah 1987) the father was advised of this necessity at
the time of the birth of the child, and even had actual prior
personal experience with the requirement.

Respondent, who as an

adoption agency had the superior knowledge in such matters, had
not advised Appellant or the natural mother of this necessity and
had even gone so far as to give advice and take steps that would
made Appellant's performance' of the acknowledgment more difficult
and time-consuming.
What the Appellant did know and believe was that he must be
indicated on the birth certificate of the child as the natural
father

in order

to establish

his parental

rights.

All the

parties believed from the date of the birth of the child that the
Appellant

was on the birth certificate.
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The inclusion of his

name on the birth certificate had been Appellant's compelling
intent, even to the point of "bargaining" with "D.R.F." to have
his

name

included.

The

trial

court

erred

in finding, in

paragraph 29 of the Court's Findings of Fact that Appellant had
not satisfied

legal requirements

to establish himself as the

natural father of the child in the State of Nevada.

Point II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE
APPELLANT TO REGISTER WITH THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF VITAL STATISTICS WHEN
APPELLANT WAS A RESIDENT OF NEVADA AND
THE CHILD WAS BORN IN NEVADA.
In its Findings of Fact, paragraph

number

34, the Court

found:
"Belanger did not register with the
Utah Department of Vital Statistics
as provided under Ut. Code Ann.
78-30-4 (1953, as amended)."
And concluded, in paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law, that
"Utah law required the natural father
making a claim of paternity to register
with the Utah Registrar of the Department
of V i t a l S t a t i s t i c s , and to indicate his
willingness to support the child to the
best of his ability, and failure to do
so prior to the child being relinquished
or placed with an agency for adoption
terminated his rights. Belanger did not
register with the Utah Department of Vital
Statistics. Since he had full knowledge
that the baby was going to be relinquished
to the adoption agency in question in the
State of Utah, and he knew when D.R.F. was
flying to the State of Utah for this purpose,
to protect his rights he was obligated to so
register.
His failure to do so terminated his
rights within Utah."
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In this matter the Court has concluded that, although the
child was born in Nevada and

the Appellant

was a resident of

Nevada and the birth certificate was filed in Nevada, the child
was placed for adoption in the State of Utah, and therefore the
Appellant

was

required

to

register

his

acknowledgment

paternity with the Utah Department of Vital Statistics.

of

If this

conclusion is reasonable it means that:
(1) all the actions of the mother
agency

in

this matter

relinquishing

in bringin-g

the

and

child

it for adoption in one day and

the

adoption

to Utah

in attempting

and
to

avoid dealing with the Appellant as regards the adoption were
justified;
(2) the birthplace
certificate of a child placed

and

state

of

for adoption

issuance

of birth

has no meaning or

importance under the law in Utah, as only Utah's records will be
checked or judged valid in determining an unwed father's claim to
paternity;
(3)

an

adoption

agency

can

deliberately

or

unintentionally fail to advise an unwed father of the requirement
to claim paternity in the State of Utah in discussions held with
said unwed father, knowing that said adoption agency

can then

avoid dealing with the wishes and rights of that father on the
technicality of simply initiating a paternity search in the State
of Utah;
(4)

an adoption agency in Utah may, as in this case,

act as if the father of a child is unknown, simply because he is
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actively

involved

in protecting his paternal rights in another

state, and has not claimed them in the State of Utah, when it in
fact does know the identity of said father

and his attitude

towards the adoption.
The primary purpose

of the filing of acknowledgment of

paternity is the issuance of a birth certificate naming a natural
mother and father as in the case of a legitimate child.

If the

State of Utah has no interest in issuing a birth certificate for
said

child , why

require

the Appellant

to file

a duplicate

acknowledgment in the State of Utah?
The facts of this case represent a conflict of law between
the states of Utah and Nevada.

"Is an adoption agency in Utah

required to recognize the rights and claims of a natural father
made in the State of Nevada regarding his child born in Nevada?"
In Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 P.2d 118 (1947),
the Supreme Court of Utah ruled

regarding

potential

loss of

rights in applying procedural and substantive law when a cause of
action or right arises in a sister state.

The Court stated:

"When the situation is one where a
different result might be reached
according to the rule applied, the
court must determine under the law
of conflicts of laws whether it will
apply the rule of a foreign state
for rules of substance and the
forum state for procedural process.
In determining whether an element or
a cause of action is a matter of
substance or of procedure, the court
will examine the statute or rule of
law creating the claimed right or
duty, and the interpretation thereof
by the courts of state creating the
right, or where the cause of action arose."
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Id at 122, emphasis added.
In this present case the Appellant's paternal right "arose"
in the State of Nevada where the birth of the child took place
and the Appellant complied with Nevada law in filing an affidavit
of acknowledgment of paternity and having himself named
father

on the issued

birth certificate.

as the

There would be a

"different result" to the ruling in this case that Appellant be
required

to file under

Utah law and that Appellant's paternal

rights be terminated

if the rule of the State of Nevada were

applied.

to Nevada

parental

According
rights

cannot

be

statute a "presumed

terminated

without

father's"

hearing,

(NRS

128.150) and the acknowledgment of paternity may be submitted "at
any time" (NRS 126.051(2)(e)).
Appellant contends that it is not reasonable nor should this
state

compel

a

citizen

of

a

sister

state

to

file

an

acknowledgment of paternity in two states particularly in light
of the fact that this child was conceived
Nevada,

the

putative

father

resided

in Nevada,

in Nevada,

born in

the

birth

certificate (a form of acknowledgment of paternity) was issued in
Nevada, the Respondent and mother knew of the existence of the
natural father and his residence in Nevada, and the Respondent
attempted to utilize a Nevada State agency to procure the consent
of the Appellant in this matter.

Further, the Respondent was in

serious violation under the Nevada statutes, Sections NRS 127.053
and NRS 127-057, regarding notice of adoption, which

impose a

misdemeanor penalty, so that if the laws of the State of Nevada
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are invoked, a completely different result would occur.
Appellant filed

suit

in Nevada

to regain custody

of his

child and Respondent filed suit in Utah five (5) days after she
was served in Nevada with the summons, thus creating the conflict
of jurisdictions.

In referring the matter to the Utah court, the

Nevada referee deferred to the present domicile of the child in
question, not to the

superior claim of Utah statute over the

actions of the parties.
should

have

determining

looked
whether

Appellant contends that the trial court

to

the

laws of the State

Appellant

had

satisfied

of Nevada

in

requirements

to

establish his paternity and whether Appellant's parental rights
should be terminated, and
had

failed

to satisfy

erred in finding that the Appellant

the requirements

paternity in Nevada, and

for acknowledgment of

the erred in requiring the Appellant to

register with the State of Utah Department of Vital Statistics.
Point III
THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT
OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY TERMINATING
APPELLANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR FAILURE
TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF CLAIM OF PATERNITY.
The most prevalent and necessarily the most important issue
in recent Utah cases involving

the paternal rights of an unwed

father is that of due process.

The rights of a putative father

have been well-established

in these and other cases.

of this case contain many of the same factual

The facts

elements of the

recent cases, but also some which are significantly different.
Deprivation of parental rights must be supported by clear
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and convincing evidence.

In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,

31 L.Ed.2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972), the United States Supreme
Court

firmly

held

that

an

unwed

father

does

constitutionally protected interest in his children.
that

case

was

a state

have

a

At issue in

law which, in effect, provided

that

children of unwed fathers become wards of the state upon the
death of the natural mother.

The court first ruled that the

interest of a father in his children is sufficiently important to
be constitutionally protected, holding-:
The private interest here, that of a man
in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent
a powerful countervailing interest,
protection. It is plain that the interest
of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her
children "come(s) to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal
is made to liberties which derive merely
from shifting economic arrangements."
The rights to conceive and raise one's
children have been deemed "essential" . . .
and "(r)ights far more precious . . . than
property rights". 405 U.S. at 651, 31
L.Ed.2d at 558. (citations omitted,
emphasis added)
The United States Supreme Court also made clear that a man's
interest in his children was no less constitutionally protected
merely because he had not been formally married to their mother:
(T)he law (has not) refused to recognize
those family relationship unlegitimized by
a marriage ceremony. The Court has declared
unconstitutional the state statute denying
natural, but illegitimate, children a
wrongful-death action for the death of their
mother, emphasizing that such children cannot
be denied the right of other children because
familial bonds in such cases were often as
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warm, enduring and important as those arising
within a more formally organized family unit . . .
"To say that the test of equal protection
should be that of 'legal1 rather than
biological relationship is to avoid the
issue . . . "
405 U.S. at 651-52, 31 L.Ed.
2d at 559 (citations omitted)
The court then unequivocally stated its holding that:
Stanley's interest in retaining custody of
his children is cognizable and substantial.
Because of the drastic nature of depriving a father of the
constitutionally protected right to his child and his parental
rights, the burden of proof must be met with evidence that is
clear and convincing.

The court has made that position clear in

the case of Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977)
where it stated:
Arising out of the natural bonds of
affection and concern which natural
parents usually have for their
children, it is and should be the
policy of the law to support and give
strength to the family by encouraging
the preservation of the parent-child
relationship and by being reluctant
to interfere with or destroy it.
Accordingly, the Court does not easily
find such abandonment, but will do so
only when the evidence is clear and
convincing that the parent has either
expressed an intention or so conducted
himself as to clearly indicate an
intention, to relinquish parental
rights and reject parental responsibilities.
This

need

for

"clear

and

convincing

evidence"

of

the

abandonment of a child before a parent's rights are relinquished
requires a careful examination of all the factual

elements in

this case to determine if Appellant "expressed an intention or so
conducted

himself

as to clearly
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indicate

an

intention"

to

relinquish or abandon his parental rights to his son.

The Court

found, in its Findings of Fact, paragraph number 34:
"Belanger did not register with the
Utah Department of Vital Statistics
as provided under Ut. Code Ann.
78-30-4 (1953, as amended)."
And, the Court concluded, in paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of
Law, that
"Utah law required the natural father
making a claim of paternity to register
with the Utah Registrar of the Department
of Vital Statistics-, and to i n d i c a t e his
willingness to support the child to the
best of his ability, and failure to do
so prior to the child being relinquished
or placed with an agency for adoption
terminated his rights. Belanger did not
register with the Utah Department of Vital
Statistics. Since he had full knowledge
that the baby was going to be relinquished
to the adoption agency in question in the
State of Utah, and he knew when D.R.F. was
flying to the State of Utah for this purpose,
to protect his rights he was obligated to so
register.
His failure to do so terminated his
rights within Utah."
In re. Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 86)
and Ellis vs. Social Services Dept., Etc., 650 P.2d 1250 (Ut.
1980)

this

Court

constitutionality

was

previously

asked

to

determine

of Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4(3).

the

In these

cases the Court avoided overturning the statute itself by stating
that the application of the statute could be looked at, and that:
If the putative father "is successful
in showing that the termination of his
parental rights was contrary to basic
notions of due process, and that he
came forward within a reasonable time
after the baby's birth, he should be
deemed to have complied with the
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statute,"
In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 208
(Utah 1984) the Court defined "within a reasonable time" or the
reasonable opportunity standard as one that applies only where it
is first shown that it was "impossible" for the father to file
"through no fault of his own,"
The "impossibility"

exception

is applicable in Swayne v.

L,D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987), Wells,
and Sanchez v, L,D.S, Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984)
because of the following:
1.

Both parents were Utah residents.

2.

The father would not assume financial responsibility for

the mother and baby,
3.

The

father

did

not

sign

a birth

certificate

or

acknowledgment of paternity.
4.

Neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency were

involved in an effort to prevent the father from asserting

his

parental rights,
5.

Neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency knew

at the time of relinquishment

that

the father was seeking

to

assert his parental rights,
A

brief

review

of

the

facts

of

this

case

highlight

significant variations with these factors:
1.

The father was a resident of Nevada; the mother was a

resident of Nevada at the time of conception of the child and a
resident

of the California immediately prior to the birth; the
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child was born in Nevada and transported to Utah after its birth.
2.

The father had plead and bargained with the mother

to

stay with the father and raise the child as a family unit.
3.

The father made every effort to be entered on the birth

certificate, and filed an affidavit of paternity.
4.

Both the child's mother and the adoption agency were

involved

in actions and omissions which

interfered

with the

father speedily asserting his parental rights, including, but not
limited to, paying for the transportation of the mother and child
to Utah

in an effort

to avoid

provisions

of

the

Interstate

Compact on Adoptions which would have put the State of Nevada and
the father on notice prior
advising

to the effecting

of the

adoption;

the mother not to enter the father's name on the birth

certificate; checking

for acknowledgment

of paternity

in the

State of Utah and not Nevada; the mother's failure to inform the
agency prior to the relinquishment of the child that the father
intended to dispute the adoption; the mother's misleading of the
father until less than one hour prior to the mother and child's
flight
Nevada;

to Utah

that she and

the agency's

failure

the child would stay with him in
to inform

the Nevada

Welfare

Department that the child was born in Nevada; agency's failure to
report to Utah authorities

that she knew

the identity

of the

natural father; agency's advice and mother's refusal to sign the
acknowledgment of paternity.
The "impossibility" exception is inapplicable, however, in
situations where both parents lived out of Utah and the child is
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born out of Utah.

In In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, and Ellis,

the Court found that even though the child was relinquished prior
to filing the notice of paternity, the bar imposed by the statute
should not apply because:
In the usual case, the putative father
would either know or reasonably should
know approximately when or where his
child was born. Ellis, p. 1256.
Appellant

sought to protect his parental rights "when and

where" the child was born, in the State of Nevada.

Utah Code

Annotated Section 78-30-4(3) in summary says that an unwed father
loses parental rights to his child if he fails to provide timely
nbtice;

in this case, the Appellant's

paternity was timely filed.

notice

of

claim

of

The Respondent filed her search for

acknowledgment of paternity on May 11, 1988 in the State of Utah.
If she had filed the same search in the State of Nevada she would
have

found

the Appellant's

Affidavit

of Acknowledgment

of

Paternity on file.
Appellant

has

been

deprived

terminating of his parental rights for

of

due

failure

process

in

the

to comply with

Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4, as was stated by the Court in In Re.
Adoption of Baby Boy Doe,
In all but the most exceptional cases,
the operation of section 78-30-4 achieves
that balance as it affords putative fathers
the opportunity to assert and protect their
rights while provided a finite point at which
the state's interest supercedes that of the
father. However, where a father does not know
of the need to protect his rights, there is
no "reasonable opportunity" to assert or
protect parental rights. In such a case, the
operation of the statute fails to achieve
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the desired balance and raises serious
due process concerns. 1x3, page 691.
In Ellis, the Court stated that "a statute fair upon its
face may be shown to be void and unenforceable as applied", and
in Wells stated "The general test for the validity of such rules,
the

test

of procedural

due

process,

is

fairness."

The

termination of Appellant's parental rights in the circumstances
of this case by either the ruling that he should have complied
with Utah Code Annotated
affidavit

of paternity

justifiable.
accorded

the

78-30-4 or that he did not file an

in the State of Nevada is not fair or

In the State of Nevada, Appellant would have been
right

of a hearing

before

termination

of his

parental rights.

Point IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FINDING THAT THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON PLACEMENT OF
CHILDREN IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
The Appellant claims that the purchase of the transportation
ticket by Respondent adoption agency for the use of the mother
and baby constitutes

having "brought, or caused to bring a child

into

state

the

receiving

for

the purpose

of placement

for

adoption" as provided under Article III, Conditions of Placement
of the Interstate

Compact on Placement of Children, Utah Code

Annotated, 55-8b, 1953 as amended.
The Respondent testified

that she sought the advice of the

authorities of the Interstate Compact before placing

the child

for adoption in Utah and claimed that she was not, according to
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the opinion of those authorities, bound by the provisions of that
Compact in the instant case.

(Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 251-252)

The

finding that Respondent should or should not have complied with
the Interstate Compact was important to Appellant because in the
event Respondent was subject to said Compact, the State of Nevada
would have been put on notice, the Respondent
would not have

and

the mother

been able to avoid dealing with the Appellant in

the adoption, and Appellant would have had more opportunity

to

assert his claim of paternity prior to the placement of the child
for adoption.
However Respondent testified

that she withheld

information

from those authorities when seeking their opinion.

It is the

belief of the Appellant that said information may or would have
affected
paid

for

their opinion, specifically that she, Respondent, had
the ticket

to transport

the mother

and child

from

California and subsequently, Nevada, and the crucial information
that the child was born in Nevada.
This is yet another
agency exercising

example

of

the Respondent

adoption

a selective process in the facts which were

revealed to others in this adoption.

She asked Dr. Bill Ward,

Deputy Interstate Compact Administrator for the State of Utah
she was bound by the Interstate Compact

if

if the birth mother

brought the child to Utah, yet she omitted to tell Dr. Ward that
she, Respondent, had paid for the ticket.
acknowledgment

of

paternity

in

She filed a search for

Utah,

knowing

acknowledgment was being pursued by Appellant
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that

said

in Nevada.

She

failed to file a search for paternity in Nevada although she knew
the child had been born there.

She "used"

the authority

and

jurisdiction of the State of Nevada by sending authorization and
release

documents

to the Nevada Welfare

Department

for

the

signature of Appellant, and yet failed to tell said authorities
that

the child was

born

in Nevada

and

used

the

expression

"putative father" for Appellant when she knew that both mother
and Appellant acknowledged Appellant's paternity.
Adoption agencies must be required to conduct their business
with the most scrupulous honesty, care, and attention to detail
because

of the

actions.

It

delicate

is unfair

and

far-reaching

that

should

one

effects

adoption

of their
agency

be

advising a putative father of his rights to claim paternity while
another takes every "legal" avenue to discourage a father

from

doing so, and, further, from dealing with the father at all.
court must

abide

by

strict

procedures

for

ascertaining

A
the

attitude and intent of a natural father before terminating his
rights in the State of Utah.
as sure of protecting

An adoption agency should be just

those rights.

There are certainly enough

instances of unwed fathers having no concern whatsoever
future

or

welfare

of their

illegitimate

offspring.

unthinkable that an unwed father who is honestly taking

for the
It is
action

and seeking to be involved in the decisions that affect his child
should be outflanked by a superior knowledge of laws in another
state.

The trial Court erred

in finding that the Interstate

Compact on Placement of Children for adoption was not applicable
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in t h i s

case.

CONCLUSION
Based

upon

the

foregoing

Points

and

Defendant/Appellant herein requests that t h i s

1.

Reverse

the

trial

court

Defendant/Appellant had s a t i s f i e d

Authorities,

Court:

and

find

that

the

the legal requirements of the

S t a t e of Nevada to e s t a b l i s h p a t e r n i t y and thereby s a t i s f i e d any
and a l l legal requirements to proclaim" himself the natural father
of h i s child;
2.

Reverse

the

Defendant/Appellant

trial

court

i s not r e q u i r e d

and

find

to r e g i s t e r

that

the

a claim of

p a t e r n i t y with the Utah Department of Vital S t a t i s t i c s when he
had done so in the State of Nevada;
3.

Reverse

the

trial

court

and

find

that

Defendant/Appellant was deprived of due process by the
ruling

the

Court's

to terminate h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s for f a i l u r e to provide

notice of claim of p a t e r n i t y ;
4.

Reverse the t r i a l court and find t h a t the

Interstate

Compact for Placement on Children was applicable in t h i s matter
and t h a t Respondent was required to act in compliance thereof;
and
5.

Order

that,

therefore,

the case be remanded,

judgment to be rendered for the Defendant/Appellant.
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